HPE iLO 4/5 truncated JSON unicode escape denial-of-service

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Updated
Vendors HPE
Products
HPE Integrated Lights-Out 4 (iLO 4), HPE Integrated Lights-Out 5 (iLO 5)
  • HPE Integrated Lights-Out 4 (iLO 4)
  • HPE Integrated Lights-Out 5 (iLO 5)
Related

Executive summary #

HPE's iLO 4/5 web service uses a custom JSON string parser that falls into an infinite loop when processing unicode escapes that include less than four hexadecimal digits (\u12). A single unauthenticated request to the session-minting endpoint wedges the entire HTTPS management service and the device does not recover until it is power-cycled.

This issue is an instance of CWE-835 (Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition), has an estimated CVSSv3.1 score of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H (7.5, High), and current SSVC vectors of "Exploitation: PoC" and "Technical Impact: Partial."

Technical details #

The affected component is the JSON string parser in the iLO web service, reached without authentication through POST /json/login_session, the endpoint that issues login sessions and is therefore pre-authentication by design. In the string-escape loop of the parser, a \u escape is decoded with sscanf(p, "\u%4x%n", &val, &n) and the cursor advances only when n == 6. For a \u escape with fewer than four hex digits, such as "\u" or "\u12", n is not 6, the advance is skipped, and the enclosing loop reads the same \ and u again without progress. The loop exits only on a closing quote, a NUL, or the output-buffer cap, none of which occur for a truncated escape, so the parser spins. Any string value in the login body, including the user_login or password value, reaches the loop.

The following request triggers the condition. It is destructive: it wedges the target until the unit is power-cycled.

curl -sk -X POST "https://example.lan/json/login_session" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"method":"login","user_login":"\u12","password":"x"}'

The triggering request receives no response and the connection times out at the client. A well-formed control request with an invalid credential returns promptly:

curl -sk -D - -X POST "https://example.lan/json/login_session" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"method":"login","user_login":"nope","password":"nope"}'
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
Content-Type: text/plain
Content-Length: 62
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 00:20:07 GMT
Server: HP-iLO-Server/1.30
X-Frame-Options: sameorigin

After the triggering request, every HTTPS endpoint (for example /xmldata?item=all and /redfish/v1/) stops responding; on firmware 2.30 the IPMI responder also fails (Unable to establish IPMI v2 / RMCP+ session) and the SSH banner times out. The unit remains in this state until it is power-cycled.

Attacker value #

This issue may allow an unauthenticated attacker to take the iLO management plane offline until manual intervention. The only precondition is network reachability of the iLO HTTPS port; no credential, session, or user interaction is required. On firmware 2.30 the host cooling fans run at full speed for the duration. The spinning loop does not trip a hardware watchdog and the offending task is not killed, so the outage persists until the management processor is hard power-cycled.

Credit #

This issue was discovered by HD Moore with the help of AI tools. Disclosure was coordinated by Tod Beardsley.

Timeline #

  • 2026-07-19: Initial findings discovered and documented
  • 2026-07-21: CVE-2026-65207 reserved
  • 2026-07-24: Vendor notified
  • 2026-07-28: Transferred reserved CVE IDs to HPE for record management
  • 2026-10-13: Public disclosure

Written by todb

Tod Beardsley is VP of Security Research at runZero, where he "kicks assets and fakes frames." Prior to 2025, he was the Section Chief for the Vulnerability Response section for CSD/VM/VRC at CISA, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, part of the US government, and a seasonal Travis County Election Judge in Texas. He's also a founder and CNA point of contact for AHA!. Tod spends much of his time involved in vulnerability research and coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD). He has over 30 years of hands-on security experience, stretching from in-band telephony switching to modern ICS/OT implementations. He has held IT ops, security, software engineering, and management positions in large organizations such as the US Government, Rapid7, 3Com, Dell, and Westinghouse, as both an offensive and defensive practitioner. Tod is a CVE Board member, has authored several research papers, and is an internationally-tolerated horror fiction expert.

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